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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, StevenJ. Goodwin, a federal prisoner, requested permis-
1
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sion to artificially inseminate his wife.' After unsuccessfully exhaust-
ing prison administrative remedies and petitioning a federal district
court, Goodwin's request was denied by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals .2
Although the Eighth Circuit found that the right to procreate is a
fundamental constitutional right, it held that the restriction on
Goodwin's right to procreate imposed by the Bureau of Prisons was
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.3 In reaching
this decision, the court applied the test set out by the Supreme Court
in the Turner v. Safley4 opinion.5 Despite the fact that the majority
applied the Turner test in a more liberal manner than any other cir-
cuit previously has, legitimate questions remain as to whether this
was the appropriate standard of review for Goodwin's request.6 This
liberal application of the Turner test could have serious implications
on the constitutional rights of prisoners in the United States.
First, this Note will review the subject of artificial insemination and
inmates. Next, it will review the development of judicial review of
prisoners' constitutional rights. Of particular concern will be the ap-
propriate standards of review employed by the Supreme Court. Af-
ter considering the approach utilized by the Eighth Circuit in
Goodwin II, this Note will focus on the implications of that decision.
Finally, a standard of review for determining the constitutionality of
actions and regulations instituted by prison officials in situations sim-
ilar to Steven Goodwin's will be proposed.
1. Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1452 (W.D. Mo. 1988) [hereinafter
Goodwin I], aff'd on other grounds, Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1396 (8th Cir.
1990) [hereinafter Goodwin I1].
2. Goodwin 11, 908 F.2d at 1400.
3. Id. The court cited three Supreme Court decisions recognizing that the right
to procreate is guaranteed under the Constitution: Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 685 (1976); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942). Goodwin II, 908 F.2d at 1398.
The court did not reach the question whether or not the constitutional right to
procreate survives incarceration. Id. at 1400.
4. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
To avoid confusion, the reader is advised that Warden C.A. Turner was a named
party in Goodwin I, Goodwin II and Turner.
5. Goodwin 11, 908 F.2d at 1399. The Turner test asks whether the regulation is
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
Thus, the test involves a "reasonable" standard of review. The Turner test consists of
four factors, the most important of which is the existence of a valid, rational connec-
tion between the prison regulation and the legitimate penological interest advanced.
Id. at 89-91.
6. In his dissent, Judge McMillian stated: "Goodwin makes a colorable argu-
ment that this case should be reviewed under a heightened scrutiny standard .... "
Goodwin 11, 908 F.2d at 1401 (McMillian, J., dissenting). However, Judge McMillian
did not pursue this argument since he found that Goodwin's request should be
granted even under the lower, Turner standard of review. Id.
[Vol. 17
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
A. Artificial Insemination and Prisoners
The right to procreate is regarded as a fundamental constitutional
right of free citizens.7 However, the right to procreate has never
been fulfilled in the prison context because prisons are not required
to provide inmates access to conjugal visitation.8 While a small
number of state prison systems have allowed conjugal visitation since
the 1970s,9 the United States Bureau of Prisons (Bureau), the federal
prison system, has never implemented such a program.' 0 Conse-
quently, the affirmative right to procreate has always been denied to
federal inmates and a majority of state inmates.
With the development of human artificial insemination over two
hundred years ago, and the lack of conjugal rights for inmates, it is
surprising that the Goodwin decisions did not occur until 1990.11 Ju-
dicial treatment of prisoners and artificial insemination was ad-
dressed in Holland v. Hutto.12 However, in denying an inmate's
request for marriage, the Holland court merely mentioned in dictum
that a state prisoner was denied his request for artificial insemina-
tion.t3 Further, the Bureau has never implemented a policy or pro-
gram regarding artificial insemination. t 4
7. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85;
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
The Griswold Court, in Justice Douglas' renowned opinion, found that the guar-
antees set forth in the Bill of Rights protect privacy interests and create a "penum-
bra" or "zone" of privacy. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. This zone of privacy, as defined
by subsequent Supreme Court cases, expressly includes what Professor Tribe refers
to as the right of "reproductive autonomy." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 15-10, at 1339 (2d ed. 1988). As discussed in this Note, references to "funda-
mental rights" include those personal rights enumerated under the Constitution and
the foregoing privacy rights.
8. Goodwin I, 702 F. Supp. at 1455 ("No court has required an institution to
provide conjugal visits for inmates [on constitutional grounds].").
9. See Note, Rethinking Conjugal Visitation in Light of the "AIDS" Crisis, 15 NEW
ENG.J. CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 121, 121 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Conjugal Visita-
tion] (Seven states allow conjugal visits in their prison system.).
10. Id.
11. Human artificial insemination was performed in England as early as 1790 by
a surgeon named John Hunter. Shapiro, New Innovations in Conception and Their Effects
upon Our Law and Morality, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 41 (1986). An American physi-
cian achieved similar success in 1866. Id. Today, in the United States alone, 20,000
babies are born each year as a result of artificial insemination. Id.
12. 450 F. Supp. 194 (W.D. Va. 1978).
13. Id. at 196.
14. Brief for Appellant, Joint Appendix at A. 11, Goodwin H, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th
Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1101WM).
1991]
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B. Federal Prison System
As with most agencies, management of federal prisons lies exclu-
sively within the province of the executive branch.i5 Congress per-
mits the Attorney General to delegate management of the federal
prison system to the Bureau.i 6 The Bureau's Director promulgates
the rules governing classification, government, treatment, care, disci-
pline, reformation, and rehabilitation of the inmates.' 7 The Bureau
promulgates its regulations in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).I8
When a federal inmate has a grievance about a prison condition,
her fate initially lies with the Bureau's administrative remedies.19
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an in-
mate asserting that a Bureau regulation is unconstitutional must ini-
tially seek administrative relief.20 A federal inmate can petition the
federal courts for relief only after she has exhausted her administra-
tive options.2l Then, a federal inmate can challenge unconstitu-
15. 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 10 (1987). Similarly, state prison systems are generally
governed by the executive branch of the respective state. Id. § 7.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1988) ("The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the
Attorney General, shall-(1) have charge of the management and regulation of all
Federal penal and correctional institutions.").
17. 28 C.F.R. § 0.96(q) (1990).
18. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-76 (1988). See also 28 C.F.R. §§ 500-572 (1990) (Bureau
regulations). The Bureau regulations provide for every aspect of a prisoner's life-
from religious practices to food services. Id.
19. See Pyles v. Carlson, 698 F.2d 1131, 1132 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("Federal prison-
ers are generally required to exhaust administrative remedies available to them.").
The Bureau Administrative procedures are outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations.
28 C.F.R. § 542 (1990). The Bureau's Administrative Remedy Program is utilized
when informal procedures have not resolved an inmate's grievance. Id. § 542.10.
The process begins with the warden of the particular institution and is then appealed
to the Bureau's regional director. Id. § 542.15. Finally, the appeal is sent to the
Bureau's General Counsel at the national level. Id.
20. See Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 991 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981). However, pris-
oners may be excused from this requirement if they can show that the administrative
remedy itself violates due process. Id. at 991 n.8.
21. A state inmate can challenge unconstitutional prison conditions under two
statutes, Federal Habeus Corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988) and the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499-500, 500 n.15
(1973) ("[H]abeus corpus may... be available to challenge.., prison conditions."); see
also J. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8.4, at 105
(1988).
A general exception to the exhaustion requirement exists for state inmates'
claims under the Civil Rights Act. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. However, this exception is
limited. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1988); see also Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for
State Prisoners Under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IowA L. REV. 935, 936-37
(1986). Title 42, section 1997 of the United States Code requires inmates to exhaust
state remedies only if a state has an administrative remedy program that complies
with federal standards under section 1997. Id. at 936. Only a small minority of the
[Vol. 17
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tional prison conditions under the habeas corpus statute.22
C. Judicial Review of Inmate Petitions
1. Agency's Regulation or Order That Impinges on a Free Citizen's
Constitutional Rights
In 1920, the Supreme Court held that an agency regulation impli-
cating a free citizen's constitutional rights should not be afforded any
deference by a court upon judicial review.23 Although the holding
has eroded with respect to constitutional property rights, it has not
with respect to a free citizen's personal or fundamental rights.24 A
strict scrutiny standard of review applies to these agency determina-
tions.25 "A regulation that significantly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right requires more rigorous scrutiny: It must be
supported by a compelling interest and closely tailored to effectuate
only that interest."26
The standard of review a court gives to an agency is directly re-
lated to the citizen's chances for success. Where a strict scrutiny
standard is not employed and the court affords the agency deference,
it is less likely that the regulation or order will be invalidated.27
states have qualifying programs. Id. at 937. However, Civil Rights claims under sec-
tion 1983 are unavailable to federal inmates because of the state action requirement.
See Note, Constitutional Law: "Newly Minted" Standard of Review for Prison Regulations has
Bittersweet Impact on Prisoners' Rights [Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct 2254 (1987)], 27 WASH-
BURN L.J. 654, 655 n.9 (1988). Because of this exception, state prisoners' habeus
corpus actions are outnumbered by their section 1983 claims. S. KRNrz, THE LAw
OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 563 (3d ed. 1986).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988). Until the early 1960s, habeus corpus was only
available to release a person from actual physical confinement. Today, the habeas
corpus statute can be used to challenge an unconstitutional prison practice. J. LIEB-
MAN, supra note 21, at 85-86.
23. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); see also B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 624 (1984).
24. In the past, the Supreme Court has distinguished between economic and
noneconomic rights. Economic rights have not been subjected to a strict scrutiny
standard since the Supreme Court rejected the "freedom of contract" philosophy
espoused in Lochner v. New York. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392,
392 n.1 (1937) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45); see also L. TRIBE, supra note
7, § 11-1, at 769-72 (discussing the collapse of Lochner). The Court generally at-
taches a strict scrutiny standard to those rights explicitly guaranteed under the Con-
stitution and fall within what Professor Ely refers to as "the 'area' . . . of sex-
marriage-childbearing-childrearing." Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values,
92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 11 (1978).
25. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 11-1, at 769 (1988).
26. B. SHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 634.
27. Id. at 629-32; see also infra note 111 and accompanying text.
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2. American Common Law and the Retreat From
the "Hands-off" Doctrine
The judicial review of prisoners' constitutional rights has not par-
alleled the judicial review of free citizens' rights. Traditionally,
courts have avoided adjudicating claims involving prisoners' rights,
adopting what became known as the "hands-off" doctrine.28 Under
this doctrine, courts simply left issues of prison management to the
discretion of prison officials.29 Under American common-law, an in-
mate could not petition a court for relief of an alleged unconstitu-
tional prison condition.30 When faced with an inmate's petition
claiming an unconstitutional prison condition, some courts have
held that there was no jurisdiction to hear the complaint. 3 ' Other
courts have held that a habeus corpus action would only allow a
court to discharge a prisoner, but would not allow the court to actu-
28. For proof that the "hands-off" doctrine is not merely a pun on Steven Good-
win's situation, see Jones & Rhine, Due Process & Prison Disciplinary Practices: From Wolff
to Hewitt, 11 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 44, 45 n.6 (1985). The term
originated in FRrrCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INMATES 31 (1961) (a docu-
ment prepared for the Bureau). Id.
29. See, e.g., Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950) ("The Govern-
ment of the United States is not concerned with, nor has it power to control or regu-
late the internal discipline of the penal institutions."); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d
330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949) ("The court has no power to interfere with the conduct of
the prison or its discipline.").
Five policies have been advanced for the "hands-off" doctrine: (1) separation
of powers; (2) federalism prevents federal courts from adjudicating state prisoners'
claims; (3) the judiciary lacks expertise in prison administration; (4) intervention
would subvert prison discipline and order; and (5) fear of a drastic increase in litiga-
tion. Haas,Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of the Decline of the "Hands-
Off" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795, 797.
30. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871) (Prisoners are slaves of
the State.); see also Millemann, Protected Inmate Liberties: A Case for Judicial Responsibility,
53 OR. L. REV. 29, 30 (1973) (discussing the judicial expansion of inmates' rights
initiated by the Supreme Court); Note, Conjugal Visitation Rights and the Appropriate
Standard ofJudicial Review for Prison Regulations 73 MICH. L. REV. 398, 401 (1974) (dis-
cussing the possible benefits to inmates of conjugal visitation); Comment, Prison Reg-
ulations Constitutionally Valid if Reasonably Related to Legitimate Penological Interests, 19
SETON HALL L. REV. 429, 435 (1989); Note, supra note 21, at 655 (discussing the
decline of the "hands-off" policy of judicial restraint regarding inmates' constitu-
tional claims).
31. See, e.g., Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 1963) (Courts should
not interfere with management of prison even where religious rights are restricted.),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.
1955) (Courts should not interfere with conduct of prison or its discipline even
where constitutional right to legal access restricted.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956);
Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir.) (Courts are without power to in-
quire into or to supervise prison administration, even where alleged constitutional
right to process invention with the U.S. Patent Office is denied.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
859 (1954).
[Vol. 17
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ally correct the complained-of prison practice.32
For example, in the 1952 case, Williams v. Steele, 33 an inmate
claimed that prison officials imposed cruel and unusual punishment
by severely burning his body and submitting him to extended peri-
ods of solitary confinement.34 Further, the inmate claimed that these
prison practices were performed in violation of his procedural due
process rights.35 The Eighth Circuit maintained that no other court
had entertained such a complaint, and held that a court could only
determine whether or not an inmate was unlawfully detained. 36
Using Cooper v. Pate3 7 as a starting point, the Supreme Court began
to retreat from the "hands-off" doctrine. A number of decisions
during the 1971 to 1972 term further drove the Supreme Court away
from the doctrine.38 One commentator suggested that this retreat
was in response to abhorrent prison conditions.39 Today, it is firmly
32. See Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 34 (5th Cir.) (citing Eagles v. U.S. ex rel.
Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 315 (1946) ("The function of habeus corpus is not to correct a
practice but only to ascertain whether the procedure complained of has resulted in an
unlawful detention.")), aff'd on rehearing, 194 F.2d 917 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
822 (1952); Hunter, 172 F.2d at 331.
33. Williams, 194 F.2d at 32.
34. Id. at 33. The prisoner was allegedly put into solitary confinement multiple
times, once for a period of seventeen days. The complaint also alleged that the in-
mate was administered "excrutiatings" multiple times, and one "excrutiating" re-
sulted in a severe burn to the inmate's arm. The court gave no explanation or
definition for "excrutiating." The prisoner protested to numerous officials on sev-
eral occasions, but to no avail. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 34. "[T]he courts have no power to supervise the discipline of the
prisoners nor to interfere with their discipline, but only on habeus corpus to deliver
from prison those who are illegally detained." Id. For another example of the Eighth
Circuit applying the "hands-off" doctrine, see Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278
(8th Cir. 1951) (Courts do not have supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of insti-
tutions provided by law for the confinement of federal prisoners.).
37. 378 U.S. 546 (1964). In Pate, the Court held that it was error to dismiss a
claim by an inmate who claimed he was denied permission to purchase certain reli-
gious publications. Id. at 546.
38. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (Parole Board must afford
parolee due process rights.); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (Prisoner who
claimed he was denied the right to practice Buddhism stated valid claim.); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (Inmate denied due process by placement in soli-
tary confinement stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.); Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971) (Inmates can use Civil Rights Act for deprivation
of constitutional rights by prison officials.); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 15
(1971) (Courts have jurisdiction to hear an inmate's complaint.); Arciniega v. Free-
man, 404 U.S. 4, 4 (1971) (Parolee afforded the statutory rights that Parole Board has
promulgated.).
39. Millemann, supra note 30, at 29 ("[W]holesale invalidations on constitutional
grounds of system-wide prison policies and practices at Arkansas, Mississippi, Ala-
bama, and Virginia evidence the growing judicial concern for the rights of
inmates.").
1991]
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established that "[pirison walls do not form a barrier separating
prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution."40
3. Determining the Constitutionality of a Prison Regulation or Action
Although the Supreme Court, in the 1970s, recognized that the
judiciary must address prisoners' constitutional claims, it did not
firmly establish a standard of review for determining the constitu-
tionality of a prison's regulation or action.41 The Court finally at-
tached a standard of review to inmate constitutional challenges in the
1974 term.42 During that year, the Court applied two different stan-
dards of review to inmates' challenges of prison regulations in two
different cases.43 The distinction as to which standard applied
hinged on whether the prison regulation affected the rights of a free
citizen.
The first of these decisions was Procunier v. Martinez.44 In Martinez,
the California Department of Corrections instituted a regulation
prohibiting inmates from writing about grievances in their corre-
spondence to outsiders.45 The Court noted that this regulation af-
fected the liberties of free citizens-those to whom the
correspondence was sent.46
40. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). The Court will recognize all explicit
constitutional rights of inmates. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (fifth
amendment's takings clause); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (fourth amend-
ment's prohibition of unreasonable searches); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' La-
bor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (first amendment's freedom of association and
fourteenth amendment's equal protection); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)
(eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) (fourteenth amendment's procedural due process); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396 (1974) (first amendment's freedom of speech); Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. 374 (1969) (sixth amendment's right to speedy trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the "penumbra" of privacy rights from the Bill of
Rights).
41. See Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 86 (7th Cir. 1974) (A lack of guidelines
in definitive Supreme Court opinions presents difficulty in determining prisoners'
rights.).
42. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 406. The Court determined that the circuits applied at
least five different standards of review to prison regulations restricting constitutional
rights, including the "hands-off" doctrine, a rationally related standard, a strict scru-
tiny standard, a "clear and present danger" standard, and a reasonableness standard.
Id.
43. See id. at 396; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
44. 416 U.S. at 396.
45. Id. at 399. The rule directed inmates not to write letters in which they unduly
complained, magnified grievances, or expressed inflammatory political, racial, reli-
gious, or other views or beliefs. Id. Any objectionable letter could have been put in
the inmate's file, where it might have been a factor in setting a date for parole eligibil-
ity, or in determining the inmate's work and housing assignments. Id. at 400.
46. Id. at 408. The Court held:
[Vol. 17
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While the Martinez Court recognized that courts are ill-equipped to
deal with prison administration and reform,47 the Court applied the
strict scrutiny test applicable to free citizens.48 In so doing, the
Court held that the regulation was an unconstitutional restriction on
the rights of those who correspond with inmates.49
In the other 1974 decision, Pell v. Procunier,50 the California De-
partment of Corrections implemented a regulation that prevented
inmates from face-to-face interviews with members of the press.5'
The Court found that the rights of the press were not sufficiently
implicated to mandate the strict scrutiny standard.52 Consequently,
the Court adopted the lower "reasonable" standard of review,53
which had previously been utilized by the Eighth Circuit.54 The rea-
sonable standard balanced the need for the regulation in furthering
prison security against the constitutional rights of the inmate.55 The
Pell Court found that the regulation promoted prison security.56
Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence
with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend
on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended redpient of
a particular letter ....
It (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 404-05 (Prison administrators face "Herculean obstacles" that "are
complex and intractable.").
48. Id. at 413. The Court held that the prison would have to show "that a regula-
tion authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmen-
tal interests of security, order, and rehabilitation." Id The Court also held that the
restriction "must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the
particular governmental interest involved." Id.
49. Id. at 416. The Court found that the regulation furthered institutional secur-
ity. However, the regulation failed the second prong of the strict scrutiny standard in
that it was overly broad: "The regulation .. .is not narrowly drawn to reach only
material that might be thought to encourage violence nor is its application limited to
incoming letters." Id.
50. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
51. Id. at 820. The regulation provided that "[piress and other media interviews
with specific individual inmates will not be permitted." Id. at 819.
52. Id. at 824.
53. Id.
54. Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1972) ("[A] court must bal-
ance the asserted need for the regulation in furthering prison security or orderly
administration against the claimed constitutional right and the degree to which it has
been impaired." (citing Smith v. Robins, 328 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Me. 1971)), aff'd,
454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972)).
55. Moore, 459 F.2d at 577.
56. Pel, 417 U.S. at 831. The regulation was implemented in response to a "vio-
lent episode that the Department of Corrections felt was at least partially attributable
to the former policy with respect to [allowing] face-to-face prisoner-press inter-
views." Id. Apparently, inmates who granted interviews gained notoriety and influ-
ence. Id. Because of this popularity, the inmates became the source of disciplinary
problems. Id. at 832. The Court did not explain the causal connection between an
inmate's popularity and his resultant social deviance.
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Thus, the Court deferred its judgment to prison officials in uphold-
ing the regulation.57
In three subsequent cases, the Court followed the "free citizen dis-
tinction" and applied the lower reasonable standard, where constitu-
tional rights of free citizens were not substantially impaired. InJones
v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, Inc. ,58 the North Carolina De-
partment of Corrections promulgated rules restricting prison un-
ions.59 The Court determined that the regulations were reasonably
consistent with the penal goal of prison security.60 The regulation
was upheld.61
In Bell v. Wolfish,62 pretrial detainees challenged prison regulations
including, restrictions on the delivery of hardback books sent from
outsiders to detainees. 63 Again, the Court found that the regulation
was rationally related to the legitimate penal goal of security, and
held that prison administrators should be afforded deference.64 The
57. Id. at 835.
58. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
59. Id. at 121 (Restrictions prohibited solicitation of inmate members, barred all
meetings of the union, and barred the delivery of the union's bulk mailings.).
60. Id. at 127. The prison administrators argued that inmate unions naturally
caused friction between inmates and prison personnel. One administrator, quoted
by the Court, stated: "Work stoppages and mutinies are easily foreseeable. Riots
and chaos would almost inevitably result." Id.
This concern was inconsistent with the district court's findings. Recognizing that
the union had meetings with the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and the Boy Scouts
of America, the district court found that " '[t]here is not one scintilla of evidence to
suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institu-
tions.' " Id. at 124 (quoting North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, Inc. v.Jones, 409
F. Supp. 937, 944 (E.D.N.C. 1976)).
61. Jones, 433 U.S. at 136.
62. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
63. Id. at 549. Other challenged regulations included body-cavity searches after
contact visits, a prohibition against receipt of packages of food and personal items,
the requirement that detainees remain outside their rooms during routine room
searches, and the practice of placing two detainees in one room. Id at 530.
64. Id. at 550. The Court grappled with the issue of whether pretrial detainees,
due to the presumption of innocence, should be afforded a higher standard of re-
view. Id. at 538. The Court found that the reasonable standard should apply. Id. at
539. The majority held that, in order to uphold a regulation, the challenged rule had
.' to be a reasonable... regulation... necessary to further significant governmental
interests ..... Id. at 552 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115
(1972)).
The Court also criticized the lower courts for not affording prison administrators
more deference:
[Recently] many of these same courts have, in the name of the Constitution,
become increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations. Judges
... have a natural tendency to believe that their individual solutions to often
intractable problems are better and more workable than those of the per-
sons who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particu-
lar institution under examination .... The wide range of "judgment calls"
[as to whether a regulation does] meet constitutional and statutory require-
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regulation was upheld. 65
The Supreme Court utilized the same reasonable standard as the
other post-Martinez decisions in Block v. Rutherford.66 Pretrial detain-
ees in Block challenged a prohibition of contact visits with members
of their family. 67 The Court found that the regulation was a rational
response to security interests and the family members' constitutional
rights were not substantially impaired.68 The regulation was
upheld.69
These post-Martinez cases demonstrate the importance of the strict
scrutiny standard of review. In applying a reasonable standard of
review, the Court has given wide deference to prison regulations and
consequently, they always uphold the regulation. Since the invalida-
tion of prison practices occurs only when the Court applies the strict
scrutiny standard, the distinction between these two standards of re-
view is critical: an inmate's success in challenging a prison regulation
is conditioned upon application of the strict scrutiny standard of
review.
4. The Turner v. Safley Test: Elimination of Strict Scrutiny?
Turner dealt with the constitutionality of two regulations: one re-
stricting inmate-to-inmate correspondence, 70 the other banning
marriages.7t Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in a sharply
divided Court, 72 reviewed the decisions of Martinez, Pell, Jones, Bell,
ments are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of
Government.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 562.
65. Id. The "double-bunking" practice was not found unconstitutional. Id. at
543. "Double-bunking" refers to the practice of putting two inmates into one cell on
a temporary basis. All other challenged regulations were upheld on security
grounds. Id. at 560.
66. 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984) ("The question before us ... is narrow: whether
the prohibition of contact visits is reasonably related to legitimate governmental
objectives.").
67. Id. at 578. The Los Angeles County Central Jail regulation provided for the
restriction of any contact by a detainee with a spouse, relative, child, friend, or other
person. Id.
68. Id. at 588. The Court held that the visitation right was outweighed by the risk
of increased importation of narcotics into the jail. Id.
69. Id. at 589.
70. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987). The Missouri Division of Correc-
tion's regulation disallowed inmates from writing or receiving mail from non-family
inmates housed within the state's penal system. Id.
71. Id. at 82. The marriage regulation permitted an inmate to marry only with
the permission of the superintendent of the prison. Permission would be given only
under "compelling" circumstances. For example, permission to marry would be
given if a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child was involved. Id.
72. Id. at 80. Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, and
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and Block.7 s Justice O'Connor noted that the strict scrutiny standard
of Martinez had not been applied in the other cases. 74 She reasoned
that applying the strict scrutiny test would hinder the ability of
prison officials to handle security problems. 75 The result, it was
feared, would be that "[c]ourts inevitably would become the primary
arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to every administrative
problem .... 76 Consequently, the Court applied a reasonable stan-
dard of review, rather than the strict scrutiny standard, to the first
regulation.
Justice O'Connor codified the factors relevant to the reasonable
standard: 77 (1) whether there is a " 'valid, rational connection be-
tween the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest
put forward to justify it' ";78 (2) whether alternative means of exer-
cising the right remain open to the prisoner;79 (3) the asserted
right's impact accommodation on guards, other inmates, and prison
resources;80 and (4) the absence of alternatives to the regulation.S'
After discussing these factors, the Court upheld the first regulation
dealing with inmate mail, finding that the regulation was rationally
related to security concerns.8 2
However, the Court did not apply the reasonable standard to the
Scalia, while Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part with Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
73. Id. at 83-91. The Court took special care to distinguish Martinez from the
other decisions. Id. at 84-86. According to Justice O'Connor, Martinez was not a
prisoners' rights case so much as it was a nonprisoners' rights case. Id. at 85-86.
Although a prisoner's rights may not be violated by censored correspondence, such
practice restricts the first and fourteenth amendment rights of those sending the cor-
respondence to the prisoner. Id,
74. Id. at 89.
75. Id. Justice O'Connor found that the second prong of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, that the regulation be the least restrictive means of achieving the regulatory
goal, "would be subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude
that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 89-91. Justice O'Connor developed the factors from the Pelt, Bell, and
Jones decisions. Id. at 89.
78. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). This is the
primary factor, since the other factors relate to the reasonableness of the relationship
between the regulation and the legitimate penological interest.
79. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. If there are alternative means of exercising the right,
additional deference should be given to prison officials. Id.
80. Id. This is the "ripple effect" factor. The larger the impact on inmates or
prison staff, the more "courts should be particularly deferential to the informed dis-
cretion of corrections officials." Id.
81. Id. "The absence of a ready alternative is evidence of the reasonableness of
the prison regulation." Id. On the other hand, a ready alternative at de minimis cost
to penological interests is evidence of unreasonableness. Id. at 91.
82. Id. at 93. The security concern was that inmate-to-inmate mail could be used
to coordinate criminal activities of prison gangs. Id. at 92.
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second regulation prohibiting inmate marriages.8S In fact, the Court
did not choose between the new Turner test or the Martinez strict
scrutiny standard.84 The Court stated: "We need not reach this
question.., because even under the reasonable relationship test, the
marriage regulation does not withstand scrutiny."85
Further, the Court hinted that application of the Martinez standard
might have been appropriate because the regulation placed a sub-
stantial restriction on the rights of nonprisoners.8 6 The Court, in
striking down the regulation, noted that prison officials advanced
two legitimate penological objectives-security and rehabilitation.87
The Court rejected the security concern because: (1) the ceremony
imposed a de minimis burden on security; (2) other security concerns
of violent "love triangles" were illogical; and (3) no "ripple effect"
could occur since the decision to marry is a private one.88
The Court invalidated the prison regulation that substantially af-
fected the rights of a free citizen.8 9 Therefore, Turner did not aban-
don the free citizen distinction or the strict scrutiny standard of
review. In fact, the decision affirmed the importance of the free citi-
zen distinction.
5. The Court's Movement Away From the "Free Citizen" Distinction and
Towards the "Presumptively Dangerous" Distinction
Since Turner, the Supreme Court has applied the reasonable stan-
dard of review and upheld challenged prison regulations in three sig-
83. Id at 97.
84. Id.
85. Id
86. ld
Some commentators and courts have concluded that the Turner court held that
the reasonable standard of review should apply to all constitutional challenges to
prison conditions. The strong language in the beginning of the Turner opinion gives
this impression. "If PellJones, and Bell have not already resolved the question posed
in Martinez, we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' consti-
tutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penologi-
cal interests." Id. at 89.
Courts and commentators have interpreted Turner as eliminating strict scrutiny.
Justice Kennedy, in Washington v. Harper, mistakenly stated that "[iln Turner itself we
applied the reasonableness standard to a prison regulation that imposed severe re-
strictions on the inmate's right to marry .... " Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct.
1028, 1038 (1990). As explained supra text accompanying notes 83-85, however, Tur-
ner did not apply the reasonableness standard to the marriage regulation. See Turner,
110 S. Ct. at 1028; see also, Note, Turner v. Safely: The Supreme Court Further Confuses
Prisoners' Constitutional Rights, 22 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 667, 697 (1989) (concluding that
the survival of the Martinez standard after Turner "seems highly unlikely").
87. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97.
88. Id. at 97-98. The Court also rejected the rehabilitative objective, finding the
prison officials' concerns to be paternal and unexplainable. Id. at 98-99.
89. Id. at 97.
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nificant cases: O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,90 Thornburgh v. Abbott 91 and
Washington v. Harper.
9 2
The prison regulation in O'Lone restricted Muslim religious serv-
ices.gs The Court upheld the regulation after determining that it
promoted institutional security.94 Justice Brennan, writing for the
dissent, argued for a "presumptively dangerous" distinction in order
to determine situations in which the strict scrutiny standard of review
should apply.9 5 Thus, using that distinction, a reviewing court
would apply the strict scrutiny standard where the regulated activity
is not dangerous.96 Otherwise, where the regulation deals with pre-
sumptively dangerous activities, the reasonable standard applies.97
Therefore, the dissent would have a court focus on the level of dan-
ger inherent in a prison regulation when determining whether strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.
In 1989, the Thornburgh court analyzed a prison regulation which
allowed censorship of incoming mail under the reasonable standard
of review.98 The Thornburgh decision showed acceptance of the pre-
sumptively dangerous distinction, and a corresponding rejection of
the free citizen distinction.
Justice Blackmun, a dissenter in Turner and O'Lone, wrote for the
majority in Thornburgh.99 First, Justice Blackmun stated that "any at-
tempt to forge separate standards for cases implicating the rights of
90. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
91. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
92. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
93. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 345. The challenged regulation resulted in the Muslim's
inability to attend Jumu'ah, a weekly congregational service. Jumu'ah is commanded
by the Koran and must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its zenith. This
prison policy was promulgated by the New Jersey Department of Corrections. lI
94. Id. at 353. An inmate seeking to attend Jumu'ah required passage through
the front gate, thereby stopping incoming traffic and allowing inmates potential ac-
cess to outsiders. Id. at 346.
95. Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting with Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens).
96. Id. The presumptively dangerous distinction follows Judge Kaufman's ap-
proach set out in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985). That
approach maintains that the level of scrutiny should depend upon "the nature of the
right being asserted by the prisoners, the type of activity in which they seek to en-
gage, and whether the challenged restriction works a total deprivation (as opposed to
a mere limitation) on the exercise of that right." Id.
97. Id. The reasonableness standard also applies when a regulation "merely re-
stricts the time, place, or manner in which prisoners may exercise a right." Id.
98. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989). The challenged regulation
permitted an inmate to subscribe to or to receive a publication without prior ap-
proval. Id. at 404. The regulation authorized the warden to reject a publication if he
determined that the publication was potentially detrimental to prison security. Id. at
405; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.70-.71 (1988) (the challenged regulation).
99. Thornburgh, 490 U.S..at 402.
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outsiders is out of step with [Pell,Jones, and Bell] . . ."100 This state-
ment could be read to eviscerate the free citizen distinction. 101 How-
ever, the Court held that the Martinez free citizen distinction still
applied to outgoing mail, and therefore, regulations restricting mail
to a free citizen were still subject to strict scrutiny.102 Because the
Court allowed this exception, the free citizen distinction may still
have life.
While the Thornburgh Court restricted the free citizen distinction, it
laid the foundation for the presumptively dangerous distinction.
justice Blackmun found that the Martinez standard should be applied
in situations where "the nature of the asserted governmental interest
is such as to require a lesser degree of case-by-case discretion
. "OS103 These situations would involve circumstances that are not
"typical of the problems of prison administration."104 Since the pri-
mary function of prison administration is security,105 the Court fo-
cused on whether the regulation involved danger or security
concerns in determining the appropriate standard of review. Thus,
the Thornburgh decision could be interpreted as a movement towards
the presumptively dangerous distinction articulated by the OLone
dissent, without explicit adoption of this distinction.106
The most recent case, Harper v. Washington,107 dealt with a pris-
oner's right to due process before undergoing involuntary drug ther-
apy.' 08 The majority held that the Turner standard applied and
therefore, the regulation was upheld.109 Because neither the free cit-
izen distinction nor the presumptively dangerous distinction were
100. ld at 410. However, in his dissent, Justice Stevens determined that the free
citizen distinction properly took account of the rights of nonprisoners. Id. at 424-27
(dissenting with Justices Brennan and Marshall).
101. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of review and its application in
cases involving free citizens, see supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
102. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413.
103. Id. at 412.
104. Id.
105. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984) ("[C]hief among [the legiti-
mate penal goals] is internal security.").
106. The outcome of Thornburgh followed this interpretation. Justice Blackmun
determined that the correspondence regulation was enacted because of " 'reasonably
founded' fears." Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 419. In light of the danger involved in the
regulation, the Court applied the Turner standard. Id. at 414.
107. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
108. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033. Washington's institutional regulation provided
that an inmate may be involuntarily treated only if he "(1) suffers from a 'mental
disorder' and (2) is 'gravely disabled' or poses a 'likelihood of serious harm' to him-
self, others, or their property." Id
109. Id. at 1039. The Court found that a psychotic inmate posed a security threat
to himself and others. Id. In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that alternatives were
available, including segregation and alternative medications. Id at 1051 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissent warned that, by not applying the least restrictive means to a
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implicated by the facts, situations where application of the strict scru-
tiny standard of review should be appropriate are unclear. 11o
Despite application of the reasonable standard in the foregoing
cases, the strict scrutiny standard of review remains important, par-
ticularly since support for the free citizen and presumptively danger-
ous distinctions still exists. Moreover, the decision to apply either a
reasonable or a strict scrutiny standard of review determines the suc-
cess of an inmate's constitutional challenge.", The reason, accord-
ing to Justice Stevens (who wrote for the dissent in Turner,
Thornburgh, and Harper), was the weakness of the reasonable standard
of review.'12 His dissents criticized the majority for providing too
much deference to prison officials' speculations. 13 Since mere spec-
ulation satisfied the nexus between the regulation and the penologi-
cal interest, Justice Stevens concluded that the Turner standard of
review was "toothless."' 14
6. Appellate Courts' Standards of Review
a. "Free Citizen" Distinction
Under the free citizen distinction, a court utilizes a strict scrutiny
standard whenever the rights of free citizens are implicated.l 5 As
discussed earlier, the Thornburgh Court determined that a court
should not "focus" on the rights of nonprisoners nor carve out a
heightened standard of review.16 However, the Court retained the
free citizen distinction applicable to outgoing mail, thus, keeping this
distinction alive.1 7 Since the decision is recent, its impact on the
circuits is yet to be determined.
Prior to the limitations of the Thornburgh decision, the Eighth Cir-
cuit applied the Turner standard of review, even where the rights of
forced psychotropic medication, the Court would be opening the door to potential
abuse by prison administrators. IAt
110. Since security risks were clearly implicated, the presumptively dangerous dis-
tinction was satisfied by application of the Turner standard. The Harper Court, how-
ever, did not explicitly recognize this distinction. Id. at 1031.
111. All three post-Turner decisions applied the reasonable standard and upheld
the challenged prison regulations.
112. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100 (1987); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.
401, 403 (1989); Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1045.
113. Turner, 482 U.S. at 100-01 ("[I]f the standard can be satisfied by nothing
more than a 'logical connection' between the regulation and any legitimate penologi-
cal concern perceived by a cautious warden ... it is virtually meaningless."); Thorn-
burgh, 490 U.S. at 430 ("No evidence supports the Court's assumption that ... these
publications will circulate within the prison and cause ... disruption.").
114. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 434 n.18.
115. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
116. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 412.
117. Id. at 413.
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free citizens were impaired. In Benzel v. Crammer, 118 the court upheld
a prison policy prohibiting telephone calls.' 9
This conservative approach to the free citizen distinction is fol-
lowed by most circuits. To illustrate, the Second Circuit has applied
the reasonable standard even to outgoing mail, the Supreme Court's
only undisputable exception to the application of the Turner
standard. 120
b. "Presumptively Dangerous" Distinction
Since Turner, only one circuit has followed the presumptively dan-
gerous distinction and found that application of the strict scrutiny
standard is appropriate in situations where danger or security con-
cerns are not implicated.121 In Pitts v. Thornburgh,122 female inmates
challenged the correctional policies of their institutions, which
placed female prisoners farther away from their homes than it placed
male prisoners.123 The District of Columbia Circuit held that the
strict scrutiny standard was appropriate where day-to-day security
concerns were not implicated. 124 The court upheld the practices of
the institution even under the strict scrutiny standard of review, be-
cause the practices furthered important governmental interests, such
as reducing overcrowding.125
c. "Regulation" Distinction
Although never recognized by the Supreme Court, some circuits
have recognized that application of the strict scrutiny standard might
118. 869 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1989). In Benzel, new telephone procedures were
implemented in the prison handbook which resulted in several telephone restrictions
for certain segregated prisoners. Id. at 1107.
119. Id. at 1109. The court found that rehabilitation and internal security con-
cerns justified the telephone policy. Id.
120. See Rodriguez v. James, 823 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1987). New York's penal
regulation censored outgoing mail to businesses. Id. at 10. The regulation was de-
vised after a number of inmates had ordered merchandise or services without having
sufficient funds to make payment. The regulation required that any business mail
requiring inmate funds receive prior approval by the prison superintendent. Id. The
court held that the regulation promoted institutional security. Id. at 12.
121. See Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1451. District of Columbia women who were sentenced to more than
one year served their time in West Virginia. Men who were sentenced to more than
one year served in institutions near or in the District of Columbia. Id. The discrimi-
nation was a result of budgetary practices and not day-to-day security management.
Id. at 1457.
124. Id. at 1456. The court relied upon Turner in finding that the reasonable stan-
dard applies to "the necessarily closed environment of the correctional institution."
Id. at 1454.
125. Id. at 1463.
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be appropriate in situations where the inmate challenges a prison
official's action and not an implemented regulation.126 Supreme
Court decisions applying the Turner standard of review had always
dealt with prison regulations promulgated by a federal or state
agency.' 27
Like most other federal agencies, when the Bureau seeks to adopt
a rule, it must comply with the APA.128 The APA requires an agency
to provide for public notice and commentary on proposed rules.129
Only after this notice and comment period can a regulation be im-
plemented and given the force and effect of law.13O
The cases recognizing this distinction are scarce. In Meriwether v.
Coughlin,13, a class of forty prisoners were allegedly abused by jailers
and transferred to other facilities in violation of their civil rights.132
The Second Circuit, although resting on other grounds, found that
use of the strict scrutiny standard might "be appropriate due to the
fact that this case involved an official response to a supposed imme-
diate threat, while Turner ... involved regulations."133 Injackson v.
Cain,'34 the Fifth Circuit also recognized this distinction, but held
that the same standard is applicable whether the issue involves an
action or a regulation.t35
The Fifth Circuit's position is clearly the majority rule. Most cir-
cuits indiscriminately apply the Turner test to actions and regulations
126. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
127. See Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1030 (1990) (regulation promul-
gated by Special Offender Center for the state of Washington); Thornburgh v. Ab-
bott, 490 U.S. 401,404 (1989) (regulation promulgated by Bureau); O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (regulations promulgated by New Jersey prison
officials); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987) (regulations promulgated by Mis-
souri Division of Corrections); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 578 (1984) (regu-
lations promulgated by the Los Angeles County Central Jail); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 523 (1979) (regulations promulgated by the Metropolitan Correctional
Center in New York); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 121
(1977) (regulations promulgated by the North Carolina Department of Correction);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 820 (1974) (regulations promulgated by the Califor-
nia Department of Corrections).
128. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1988). See James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 631 (3d Cir.
1989) (The Bureau must comply with the APA's rule-making provisions.).
129. Id. § 553(b).
130. Id.
131. 879 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1989).
132. Id. at 1040. The lengthy allegations included retaliatory transfers and physi-
cal abuse by prison officials. Id.
133. Id. at 1043.
134. 864 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1989).
135. Id at 1248. The court provided no authority for this determination. Id. The
inmate alleged that he was assigned to work in a rat-infested area, was permanently
injured by hand-cuffs applied too tightly, and was refused medical treatment-all in
retaliation for letters he sent to the warden. Id. at 1239.
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alike.13 6 The courts fail to explain this application, and a colorable
argument can be made in favor of applying the Martinez standard to a
prison official's actions. While some appellate courts have recog-
nized the distinction, none have applied the strict scrutiny standard
of review based upon the regulation/action distinction. Accordingly,
the regulation/action distinction has not been addressed by the
Supreme Court.
III. GOODWIN V. TURNER
A. Facts and Procedure
Steven J. Goodwin is an inmate at the Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri.'17 OnJune 8, 1987, he requested
that prison officials allow him to artificially inseminate his wife.138
Goodwin explained that potential risks to his wife and future child
could result if conception was delayed until he was released.' 3 9 Be-
136. See, e.g., Burton v. Nault, 902 F.2d 4, 5 (6th Cir. 1990) (Actions of prison
officials in reading inmate's mail after suicide attempt were analyzed under reason-
able standard of review.); Robinson v. Palmer, 841 F.2d 1151, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Prison official's actions in banning particular spouse from visiting inmate were ana-
lyzed under reasonable standard of review.); Lane v. Griffin, 834 F.2d 403, 407 (4th
Cir. 1987) (Reasonable standard applied to policy decision to deny specific inmate
request for Muslim services.). This author has failed to find a circuit decision giving
detailed reasoning behind the application of the reasonable standard to prison offi-
cial's actions.
137. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1396 (8th Cir. 1990).
138. Id. at 1397. Goodwin's request complied with the Bureau's informal proce-
dure requirements. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13 (1990) (Informal Administrative Proce-
dure). This request read, "My wife and I are requesting authorization and medical
assistance in conceiving a child while I am incarcerated by means of artificial Insemi-
nation [sic]. your cooperation would be greatful [sic] in this matter." Brief for Ap-
pellant, Joint Appendix at A.9, Goodwin H, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-
110 1WM). Case Manager Bill Wunderle's response read, "The Bureau of Prisons
has no program or provisions for such a request." Id.
Goodwin's original request sought several medical doctors and one medical as-
sistant to assist with the procedure and also sought provisions for freezing the sperm.
Goodwin 11, 908 F.2d at 1397. After seeking the advice of Doctor Shelley Kolton, an
expert in fertility, Goodwin changed his request to (1) a place to masturbate; (2) a
clean container; and (3) a means to swiftly transport the semen outside. See Brief for
Appellant, Joint Appendix at A.62, Goodwin 11, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-
1 IO1WM). The Bureau of Prisons' expert, Dr. Dante Landucci, found that "it is nec-
essary that the recipient be present locally, that there be prompt delivery of the
sperm, and that there be an appropriately experienced gynecologist available." Id. at
A.42. However, it is likely that Doctor Landucci was not an expert in fertility, since
he admittedly spoke to an expert in coming to his conclusion. See id.
139. Goodwin H, 908 F.2d at 1397. At the time of his request, Goodwin's wife was
twenty-seven years old and Goodwin was eight years from his latest possible release
date. Id. (potential for earlier release existed). The risks associated with
pregnancies of older women are primarily Down's syndrome and other chromosomal
abnormalities. Id.
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cause the Bureau had never promulgated any rules regarding artifi-
cial insemination, 140 Goodwin's request was denied.141
Goodwin appealed the decision to the regional and national ad-
ministrators of the Bureau without success. 142 Finally, on August 19,
1987, Goodwin filed a pro se writ of habeus corpus seeking the right
to artificially inseminate his wife.143 On November 18, 1987, Federal
Magistrate James C. English held that the rejection of Goodwin's
complaint on the grounds that the prison did not have a policy vio-
lated Goodwin's right to due process.144 Magistrate English granted
a partial order including a requirement that the federal prison ad-
ministrators form an artificial insemination policy within 120 days.145
Counsel for the Bureau took exception to Magistrate English's or-
140. Id. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 500-72 (1990) (As of this time, the Bureau has still not
promulgated a regulation regarding an inmate's right to artificial insemination.).
141. Goodwin II, 908 F.2d at 1397.
142. Id. In his complaint, Goodwin requested: (1) permission to produce accept-
able semen; (2) medical personnel to enter the prison to collect the semen;
(3) proper testing to insure that he was free of the HIV virus; and (4) not to be
transferred until his grievance was fully resolved. Goodwin was found to be HIV
negative. Id. at 1397 n.4. Goodwin also offered to pay for all expenses. Further,
Goodwin's wife and child had never drawn governmental assistance in any form, in-
cluding welfare, and claimed that any child fostered by Goodwin would not be a bur-
den on society. Brief for Appellant, Joint Appendix at A.6, Goodwin II, 908 F.2d 1395
(8th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1 O1WM).
143. Goodwin II, 908 F.2d at 1395.
144. Brief for Appellant, Joint Appendix at A.6, Goodwin II, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th
Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1101 WM). The order did not require officials to form a favorable
policy, rather, it only required officials to promulgate a uniform policy or individually
evaluate Goodwin's request. Id. Consequently, the order either allowed the Bureau
to create a rule through legislative means or to adjudicate Goodwin's request.
145. See Goodwin I, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (W.D. Mo. 1988). The Bureau sub-
mitted a report to the district court which provided justifications for denying Good-
win's request. The gravamen of the report was that similar requests would have to be
granted to indigent male inmates and to all female inmates because of equal protec-
tion goals. Id. The result would be a burden on prison resources. Brief for Appel-
lant, Joint Appendix at A.36-41, Goodwin II, 905 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-
1101lWM).
The Bureau's report resulted in an agency action adopting a rule with a retroac-
tive effect. That is, the Bureau sought to apply its newly adopted policy to Steven
Goodwin's request. The distinction between retroactive and prospective rulemaking
is the touchstone of the distinction between adjudicative and legislative rulemaking.
See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES § 7 (1989). As the Supreme Court
indicated in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Company, agency adoption of a prospective rule
through adjudication is prohibited and prospective rules must be adopted pursuant
to the APA. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 769 (1952).
Since the Bureau adjudicated Goodwin's request, a strong argument exists for
subsequent requests by federal inmates seeking artificial insemination that the Bu-
reau has not yet adopted a rule, since it has not complied with the APA. See B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 193 (1984).
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der and the matter went before the United States district court.1 46
Judge Collinson, writing for the majority, recognized that procrea-
tion is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution.147
However, the court found this right to be inconsistent with incarcera-
tion and therefore forfeited by prisoners.148 To justify the holding,
the court relied on Southerand v. Thigpen 149 and the conjugal rights
cases.150
In Southerland, the Fifth Circuit rejected a female inmate's request
to breastfeed her child.15, The Goodwin I court quoted the Souther-
land court: "'The considerations that underlie our penal system jus-
tify the separation of prisoners from their spouses and children
.... .'"152 The court then stated that no court has found that a pris-
oner has a constitutional right to conjugal visits.'15 The court found
artificial insemination analogous to conjugal visits and outside the
"reasonable contours" of an inmate's protected rights.t54
Goodwin appealed the decision denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.'55 The basis
for his appeal was that the Bureau's refusal to allow him to ejaculate
into a clean container so that his semen could be used to artificially
inseminate his wife violated his constitutional right to procreate.' 56
B. Court's Analysis
Judge Magill, writing for the majority, first recognized that the
right to procreate is guaranteed under the Constitution and conflicts
with a regulation prohibiting a prisoner from artificially inseminating
his spouse.' 57 In choosing a standard of review, the majority re-
jected the free citizen distinction, utilizing the reasonable standard
of review.158 The court found Goodwin's wife's constitutional rights
146. Goodwin 1, 702 F. Supp. at 1452.
147. Id. at 1454.
148. Id.
149. 784 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1986) (The right to breastfeed a child is a privacy right
under the Constitution but is inconsistent with incarceration.).
150. Goodwin I, 702 F. Supp. at 1455. The court did not cite any particular case
but simply stated that no court has ever held that the right to conjugal visitation is a
constitutionally protected right. Id.
151. Southerland, 784 F.2d at 718.
152. Goodwin 1, 702 F. Supp. at 1455 (quoting Southerland, 784 F.2d at 716).
153. Goodwin 1, 702 F. Supp. at 1455.
154. Id. at 1454.
155. Goodwin II, 908 F.2d 1395, 1396 (8th Cir. 1990).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1398. Judge Magill was joined by Judge William C. Hanson, Senior
United States District Judge for the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, who
was sitting by designation. Id. Judge McMillian dissented. Id. at 1400.
158. Id. at 1398-99.
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to be "irrelevant."' i59
Under the Turner analysis, the majority found that the legitimate
penological interest served was the equal treatment of female prison-
ers.' 60 Specifically, female inmates' requests for impregnation
through artificial insemination with resultant pregnancies and infant
care would be too burdensome for the prison system.' 6 1 The court
explicitly acknowledged that the equal treatment of women prisoners
was not based on constitutional grounds but on the Bureau's own
policy to treat male and female prisoners equally.' 62
Second, the court noted that there was no readily available alterna-
tive to the regulation.163 The court found the absence of a ready
alternative to be evidence of the reasonableness of the Bureau's
policy. 164
Finally, the court held that accommodation of Goodwin's request
would have a "ripple effect" on female inmates and, therefore, the
court should bow to the "informed discretion" of the prison offi-
cials.165 Goodwin filed for a rehearing en banc on July 30, 1990.166
This request was denied on September 25, 1990.167
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GOODWIN DECISION
A. Denial of Artificial Insemination to Inmates
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,168 Justice Douglas stressed the importance
of not allowing the government to determine who should be allowed
to procreate, especially inmates. "[P]rocreation [is] fundamental to
159. Id. at 1399. The majority rejected the notion that implication of free citizens'
constitutional rights mandates a strict scrutiny standard. Id
160. Id. at 1399 n.7 ("Other interests advanced by the Bureau are not legitimate
penological interests because.., they have nothing to do with prison administration."
(emphasis in original)).
161. Id. at 1400.
162. Id. Assuming that Steven Goodwin's request was allowed, a female inmate
could not bring an equal protection claim under the Constitution to receive a recip-
rocal right. In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., the Court held that
inmates bringing equal protection claims under the Constitution must show that "the
.. groups are so similar that discretion has been abused." Jones v. North Carolina
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977). A class of female inmates is completely
distinct for the purposes of sexual reproduction. See Michael M. v. Sonoma County
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1981) (Men and women are not similarly situ-
ated with respect to pregnancy under the Equal Protection Clause.); cf. Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981) (Because of biological differences, women and men
are not similarly situated with respect to combat and draft registration.).
163. Goodwin H, 908 F.2d at 1400.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1395 (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied).
167. Id.
168. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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the very existence and survival of the race.... [The power over pro-
creative rights] [i]n evil or reckless hands.., can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear." 169
Currently, the United States has the highest percentage of incar-
cerated persons in the world.170 A disproportionate number of
those incarcerated are minorities.171 A recent report concludes that,
because the recent "war on drugs" targets inner-city residents which
are highly represented by minorities, the current trend is a growth in
the minority population of prisons.172
Justice Douglas' statement may be prophetic. That is, restrictions
on procreative alternatives in the American penological system has a
disproportionately large impact on minority communities. Obvi-
ously, the ability to artificially inseminate will not cure the effects of
the current trends in the criminal justice system. It is, however, an
inexpensive method to achieve procreation without the security
problems associated with conjugal visitation73
Finally, the use of artificial insemination ensures that wives of in-
mates are not punished for their spouses' crimes. These innocent
parties are denied one of the fundamental rights of humanity, the
right to bear children. Artificial insemination is a practical alterna-
tive that minimizes harm to the innocent.
B. Analysis
1. High Level of Deference to Prison Offwials
The Goodwin H decision marked a high level of court deference to
prison officials' decisions regarding prison regulations.174 The ma-
jority found that the equal treatment of female inmates mandated
169. Id. at 541.
170. Mpls. Star Tribune, Jan. 5, 1991, at 7A, col. 1. A private report by The Sen-
tencing Project, a nonprofit research organization that promotes sentencing reforms
and alternatives, concluded that 426 out of every 100,000 United States residents are
incarcerated. The annual cost to incarcerate these people is $16 billion. Id.
171. Id. The rate of incarceration for black American men is 3,109 out of every
100,000. I.
172. Id. at 7A, col. 2. New sentencing guidelines and tougher penalties for drug
offenses have resulted in the growth of the minority prison population. Id.
173. See generally Note, Conjugal Visitation, supra note 9.
174. The circuits are not consistent as to what level of deference to apply. The
Seventh Circuit has required a "strong showing." See DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d
442, 448 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Generalized security concerns, however, are insufficient to
support such a ban. Instead, prison officials must come forward with evidence that
the specific contact at issue threatens security .. "); Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867,
878 (7th Cir. 1988) (Despite state prison administrators' showing that offering differ-
ent religious services would increase security risks due to increased inmate move-
ment, administrators "offered no tenable ground for overruling the conclusion ...
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that female inmates be allowed to be artificially inseminated if Steven
Goodwin's request was granted.175 The court concluded that female
inmates would seek permission to be artificially inseminated and this
would burden the prison system with pregnant prisoners and in-
fants.176 The dissent noted, however, that it was mere speculation
that a female inmate would ultimately request artificial insemination
and that, in any event, this situation would present a different
case. 177
The real flaw in the majority's hypothetical situation is that it fails
to distinguish between artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization.
Artificial insemination occurs by placing the male's sperm into a wo-
man.178 In vitro fertilization is the procedure in which an ova is re-
moved from a woman and fertilized in a culture dish. 179 The culture
dish, instead of a womb, provides the reproductive environment for
the egg and sperm. After fertilization, a doctor may place the em-
bryo in the uterus of the genetic mother who supplies the egg for
fertilization, or in the uterus of another woman.180 The procedure
divides the definition of "mother" into two aspects: the genetic
mother who supplies the egg for fertilization, and the carrying
mother in whose womb the child develops.' 18 In the future, technol-
that ... regular communal worship ... (had] an adequate relationship to legitimate
penological interests.").
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit required a "strong showing" in Swift v. Lewis. Swift
v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 731 (9th Cir. 1990). Despite the state prison officials' security
justifications that a grooming policy provided for quick identification, reduction in
the number of pat searches, and reduction in homosexual activities, the administra-
tors "failed to provide any evidence that the interests asserted [were] the actual bases
for their grooming policy." Id. (emphasis in original). But see Kahey v. Jones, 836
F.2d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1988) (Judge Rubin concluded, "[S]he is in prison and we
defer to the decisions of the prison authorities in such administrative matters."); see
also Gerhardstein, False Teeth? Thornburgh 's Claim That Turner's Standardfor Determining a
Prisoner's First Amendment Rights is Not Toothless, 17 N. Ky. L. REV. 543 (1990) (analyzing
deference afforded by Sixth Circuit and concluding courts should take in-depth look
at institutional records to validate prison officials' claims).
175. Goodwin II, 908 F.2d 1395, 1400 (8th Cir. 1990).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1406-07 (McMillian,J., dissenting). "A female inmate's request for arti-
ficial insemination is not before us today. We should decide cases on a case-by-case
basis, and encourage the accommodation of inmates' constitutional rights where pos-
sible." Id.
178. See R. BLANK, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 25-28 (1990) (discussing political
and public policy issues surrounding innovations in human reproduction); Williams,
Differential Treatment of Men and Women by Artificial Reproduction Statutes, 21 TULSA LJ.
463, 464 (1986).
179. See C. AUSTIN, HUMAN EMBRYOS 34 (1989). With the assistance of a suction
needle and a laparoscope, a "slim telescope" which is inserted through the abdomi-
nal wall, eggs are collected from the donor's ovary. Id.
180. Id. at 34-36.
181. R. BLANK, supra note 178, at 9-10 (A child could have five "parents": the
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ogy may give a woman even more options to have children, without
actually bearing them.' 8 2
The equal treatment of prisoners would mandate the accessibility
of in vitro fertilization to female inmates, not impregnation by artifi-
cial insemination. Equal treatment would allow a woman to give her
egg, just as a man gives his semen. Allowing in vitro fertilization
would not necessarily burden the prison system with pregnant in-
mates or infants. Unfortunately, the court failed to explore the
technological differences between artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilization. Consequently, the court's acceptance of conjecture and
hypothetical threats resulted in the denial of Steven Goodwin's con-
stitutional rights.
2. Creation of a New Penological Interest
The Goodwin II decision also weakened the existing Turner standard
of review by applying the test in a manner no other circuit has uti-
lized. The Goodwin II court identified a new penological interest, the
equal treatment of female inmates.183 No other circuit court using
the Turner standard of review has applied this penological interest or
created a new non-traditional penological interest.' 8 4
The most important factor in the Turner standard is the rational
connection between the regulation or action and a legitimate peno-
logical interest.185 The Supreme Court has identified these tradi-
tional penological interests as institutional security, rehabilitation of
prisoners, and deterrence of crime.' 86 An overwhelming majority of
the circuit courts that apply the Turner standard of review advance
genetic mother, the carrying mother, the nurturing mother, the genetic father, and
the nurturing father.); Williams, supra note 178, at 468. It is appropriate to call this
procedure by its generic and popular term, "surrogate motherhood." "Surrogate
motherhood," however, refers to a pregnancy created using several techniques, in-
cluding fertilization through artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization. Id.; see
also Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artficial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5
W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 639, 641, 649 (1983) (reviewing the potential legal problems
involving surrogate mothers and artificial fathers).
182. See C. AUSMN, supra note 179, at 32-81 (exploring the future of procreation
technology in such areas as hybrids, cloning, and genetic engineering).
183. Goodwin II, 908 F.2d at 1399-1400.
184. The author was unable to find a federal court of appeals case utilizing the
Turner standard of review with a penological objective other than security, rehabilita-
tion, deterrence, or costs.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
186. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974). The
Supreme Court has used other terms that are synonymous with this list. Bell v. Wolf-
ish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 546 (1979) ("punishment," "retribution," "order," and "dis-
cipline"). These objectives are within the scope of the legitimate penological goal
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the penological interest of security.18 7 Some circuits also utilize the
listed. For example, "punishment," "retribution," and "discipline" are within the
scope of rehabilitation. Similarly, "order" promotes institutional security.
Prior to Goodwin II, the Eighth Circuit was in accord with these objectives. See
Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1989).
187. Most circuit court decisions utilizing or attempting to utilize the legitimate
penological goal of institutional security fall into five categories:
1) Denial of religious rights.
See, e.g., Blankenship v. Gunter, 898 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1990) (regulations
prohibiting inmates from using money from inmate trust fund for religious dona-
tions); Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1989) (restrictions on Jewish wor-
ship services); McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993 (11 th Cir. 1989) (restrictions on
Satanist's religious practices); Siddiqi v. Leak, 880 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1989) (restric-
tions prohibiting Jewish inmates from participating in a minyan); Johnson-Bey v.
Lane, 863 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1988) (regulation restricting Moorish inmates from
practicing ceremonies); Mumin v. Phelps, 857 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1987) (restricting
Hebrew literature); Higgins v. Burroughs, 834 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1987) (prohibiting
inmate frorm carrying rosary); Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1987) (regulation
prohibiting worship services without Muslim chaplain present); McCabe v. Arave,
827 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1987) (regulation restricting Aryan Nation member's wor-
ship); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987) (regulations restricting Native
Americans' religious ceremonies).
2) Restrictions on access to legal resources.
See, e.g., Smith v. Erickson, 884 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1989) (restrictions on postage
and supplies for legal matters); Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988) (de-
nial of access to legal resources); Valentine v. Beyer, 850 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1988)
(restrictions on legal assistance programs); Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir.
1987) (restrictions on attorney entering prison); Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639
(7th Cir. 1987) (restrictions to legal resources); Abel v. Miller, 824 F.2d 1522 (7th
Cir. 1987) (restrictions on attorneys and paralegal entering prison).
3) Beard and hair length grievances.
See, e.g., Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1990) (beard regulation),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 996 (1991); Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990)
(Hair length regulation did not impinge on Native American's free exercise of reli-
gion.); Dunavant v. Moore, 907 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1990) (Beard regulation impinged
on Aryan Nation member's religious beliefs.); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571
(2d Cir.) (Haircut regulation impinged on Rastafarians' religious beliefs.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 372 (1990); Swift v. Louis, 901 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1990) (grooming policy);
Soloman v. Zant, 888 F.2d 1579 (11 th Cir. 1989) (shaving regulation for death-row
inmates); Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960 (7th Cir. 1988) (Hair length regulation
impinged on Rastafarians' religious beliefs.).
4) Searches.
See, e.g., Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990) (pat-downs by female
guards on male inmates); Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702 (9th
Cir. 1989) (body cavity searches); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989)
(testing for AIDS); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988) (strip
search); Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1988) (digital rectal searches),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075 (1989).
5) Mail, communication, or visitation grievances.
See, e.g., Mason v. Clark, 920 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting possession of
AM/FM radio); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1989) (prohibiting posses-
sion of typewriter with memory); Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1989)
(denying certain incoming mail); Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1989)
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penological interest of cost efficiency,188 although this interest has
been rejected by the Third Circuit. 8 9
The equal treatment concern advanced in Goodwin II is tenuous.
Nowhere in the Bureau's promulgated regulations is this interest
identified.190 In fact, the federal courts of appeals, including the
Eighth Circuit, have recognized that disparate treatment on the basis
of sex is often a necessary part of prison management.'91 Male pris-
oners simply pose a greater security threat.192
The traditional penological goals of internal security, rehabilita-
tion, deterrence of crime, and efficiency of prison spending are left
to prison administrators because these administrators have expertise
in these areas.' 93 To defer judgment in an area outside of this ex-
(restricting telephone calls); Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266 (3d Cir. 1987) (disci-
plining inmate for contents of letter).
188. See, e.g., Ali v. Dixon, 912 F.2d 86, 91 (4th Cir. 1990) (allowing prisoner to
change name would involve inefficient and costly procedures); Benjamin, 905 F.2d at
579 (implementing Rastafarians' religious diet could be costly); Kahey v. Jones, 836
F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1988) (Prisons are not full-scale restaurants and cannot ac-
commodate Islamic inmate's diet.).
189. See Monmouth County Correctional Instit. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
336 (3d Cir. 1987). The Monmouth County Correctional Institution's policy pro-
vided for abortions only when a life-threatening situation endangered the mother.
Id. at 328. "The sole governmental interest asserted by the County as justification
for its policy is that unspecified, yet insurmountable, administrative and financial bur-
dens will result if the County is required to provide access to and funding for elective,
nontherapeutic abortions." Id. at 336 (footnote omitted). The court rejected this
penological interest. Id. at 337.
190. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 500-72 (1990).
191. See Timm, 917 F.2d at 1103 (Bright, J., dissenting) ("To treat men and women
[inmates] as equals does not require that courts ignore that differences exist."); see
also Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (In determining if
sexual discrimination is related to a penological objective, a court "need not (and
[should] not) disregard the special difficulties that arise in a prison context."); Mor-
row v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1985) (Sexual discrimination is justified
by administrative efficiency.).
192. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1103 (" 'Security concerns may arise from a variety of
sources ... all of which may differ at various institutions and may or may not have
some relationship with gender ......."(quoting Timm v. Gunter, No. CV85-L-501, at
16 (D. Neb. 1988) (memorandum decision))).
193. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). But see Tippet v. Maryland, 436
F.2d 1153, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971). In Tippet, the court affirmed the position of a strong
critic of the prison system:
Mr. Chief Justice Burger has taken the lead in pleading for a reforma-
tion of our correctional system, which, in general, is woefully deficient ....
Too many prisoners serve their allotted time and are released into society
with the same predisposition to anti-social conduct as they had before their
arrests. In all too many instances, imprisonment serves the converse of [its]
purpose, converting good prospects for rehabilitation into hardened
criminals. The result, of course, is a grave wrong for those convicts who
could be helped by getting help. It is a grave wrong to society, which must
suffer their continued depredations when released from prison until they
are confined again.
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pertise, as in Goodwin II, could bring troubling consequences.
A recent 60 Minutes newsreport illustrated this point. t94 The re-
port examined the medical staff at the Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, the facility where Steven Goodwin
is incarcerated.195 The report detailed the incompetence of that fa-
cility's medical staff.196 This was the same medical staff that gave the
Bureau the "informed discretion" upon which the court relied to dis-
allow the artificial insemination procedure.197
V. PROPOSAL
The weakness of the Turner standard of review shows the need for
the utilization of the strict scrutiny standard of review, especially
where fundamental privacy rights, such as the right to procreate, are
at issue. The free citizen, presumptively dangerous, and regulation/
action distinctions could bring about this result. Strong policy argu-
ments can be made for the application of each distinction.
A. "Free Citizen" Distinction
First, when the rights of free citizens are implicated, a strict scru-
tiny standard has been utilized.' 98 This distinction, while creating a
heightened standard of review, did not result in the Court's large
scale invalidation of prison regulations.199 Justice O'Connor's fear
that the judiciary would eventually manage the prison system did not
materialize.
Second, a free citizen's access to inmates is an important tool to
keep a check on the practices of the prison system. 200 Strict scrutiny
of prison regulations would ensure sufficient public access to main-
tain public awareness of prison practices.
Finally, Goodwin II demonstrates that the Bureau's regulations and
Id. The 1971 Tippett decision is in accord with the 1991 report by The Sentencing
Project which concluded that, despite the United States' high incarceration rate and
expenditure, the prison system fails to make the United States a safer nation. Mpls.
Star Tribune, supra note 170, at 7A, col. 1. Consequently, additional consideration
should be given as to whether prison administrators should be afforded deference to
the extent the Court has provided.
194. Sixty Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 17, 1991).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Goodwin H, 908 F.2d at 1400.
198. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974).
199. Under the free citizen distinction, the Court's only invalidation of a prison
regulation occurred with respect to the mail regulation at issue in Martinez. Id. at
409.
200. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1973) (Visitation policies may not
control content of information visitor receives, and prison administrators cannot
conceal conditions and practices of prison to outside world.).
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actions reach beyond the prison walls to control fundamental rights
of free citizens. Procreation regulations have a more substantial im-
pact on the rights of free citizens than do the mail regulations the
Court has examined. The Court, by reaffirming the viability of the
free citizen distinction, could limit the reach of prison administrators
to inmates.
This is not to say that prison administrators cannot promulgate
rules that restrict the rights of free citizens, but the strict scrutiny
standard requires the regulation to be the least intrusive means of
accomplishing the regulatory goal. Prison administrators seeking to
impinge on the rights of nonprisoners should be forced to examine
every possible alternative before promulgating such a regulation.
B. "Presumptively Dangerous" Distinction
The presumptively dangerous distinction applies strict scrutiny
where a regulation does not involve dangerous activities. If an in-
mate's grievance does not involve a dangerous activity, it is likely
that the challenged action is outside the scope of a prison adminis-
trator's area of expertise. Unfortunately, no court has yet accepted
this distinction. In Goodwin H, the court gave deference to prison
officials' judgment in the area of artificial insemination, not a pre-
sumptively dangerous activity.2O1
The traditional penological goals are useful in determining what
practices fall within this distinction. Clearly, security of the prison is
strongly connected with the level of danger inherent in a regulation,
and deference should be afforded to this penological interest.
Rehabilitation can also be related to the danger of a practice. If a
criminal is released without reformation of her behavior, public
safety is jeopardized. Again, deference should be afforded when this
interest is implicated. Similarly, deterrence of other criminal acts by
inmates or by third persons is also a strong public safety concern.
Prison officials have expertise in this area and their decisions should
be subject to a lower level of scrutiny.
The penological concern of cost efficiency may or may not be re-
lated to the dangerousness of the activity. If prison spending is re-
lated to one of the other penological goals, deference to prison
officials should be allowed. If not, then the denial of a constitutional
right because of monetary concerns should be carefully
scrutinized.202
Therefore, the presumptively dangerous distinction could be ef-
fectively applied using the traditional penological concerns as guide-
201. Goodwin H1, 908 F.2d at 1400.
202. Some circuits have already recognized this type of scrutiny where monetary
considerations are involved. See, e.g., supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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lines. The result would be to apply strict scrutiny where prison
officials are acting outside the area of their expertise.
C. "Regulation/Action" Distinction
The regulation/action distinction would apply strict scrutiny
where the challenged prison rule is not promulgated according to
the APA. The APA's rulemaking provisions allow for public notice
and comment, which informs the agency and helps create well-rea-
soned laws.20 3
If the rulemaking procedures are not followed, poorly reasoned
rules can be given effect by local prison officials. The public may not
be aware of these local prison practices because there is not a re-
quirement that they be given notice in a federal or state register.
20 4
A warden or jailer acting outside of the scope of these regulations is
acting outside the regulations imposed by the governing body of the
agency. Consequently, prison regulations not enacted according to
state or federal rule making procedures should be subject to strict
scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
Goodwin II demonstrates the weakness of the Turner standard of
review. By accepting a new penological interest, the equal treatment
of female prisoners, the court further debilitated the standard into a
rubber-stamping of prison officials' practices. The court, by not pro-
viding an appropriate level of judicial scrutiny of prison regulations,
ignored medical advances in the use of artificial insemination and
prevented a sizeable portion of the American population from
procreating. Strict scrutiny can ensure that the results of Goodwin II
are not duplicated. The use of the free citizen, presumptively dan-
gerous, and regulation/action distinction would allow for appropri-
ate application of the strict scrutiny standard in situations and would
better protect the basic constitutional rights of both inmates and free
citizens.
T. Joe Snodgrass
203. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171 (1984). "The APA requirement of
antecedent publicity was designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of
rules. Its purpose is to allow the agency to benefit from the expertise and input of
those who file comments .... " Id.
204. Id. ("The notice of any proposed rulemaking must be published in the...
Register.").
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